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NOTES
CHRYSLER CORPORA TION v. BROWN:
SEEKING A FORMULA FOR
RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE
UNDER THE FOIA
The federal government's amassment of detailed financial and commer-
cial information from individuals and corporations pursuant to its ex-
panding regulatory activity has raised widespread concern about privacy
infringement and potential government abuse. In response to these con-
cerns, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) l in 1966
to provide public access to information upon which the federal govern-
ment bases its decisions.2 Because the FOIA necessarily focuses upon the
release of information to the public,3 it is silent on the rights of persons
other than requesters of information. There is evidence, however, that this
broad disclosure policy has led to abuse of the FOIA, predominantly
among corporate and industrial rivals.4 Consequently, despite the absence
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
2. Courts have interpreted the statute's purpose consistently. See, e.g., Department of
Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976) (FOIA is expressly designed to make official
information available for public inspection); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (FOIA
seeks to permit public access to official information shielded unnecessarily and attempts to
create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information); SDC Dev. Corp. v.
Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1976) (FOIA embodies deep congressional concern
over the ability of the American people to obtain information about the internal workings of
government).
3. Congress intended the Act to provide for "the fullest responsible disclosure." S.
REP. No. 813, .89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., FREE-
DOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK 38 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974
SOURCE BOOK]. For an understanding of the term "responsible disclosure," see the nine
classifications of exempt information, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l)-(9) (1976). See also note 37 and
accompanying text infra.
4. Suits have been initiated by submitters of information under a claim that the pro-
posed release of information would harm their competitive positions and should be pro-
tected under the fourth exemption which states that the Act does not apply to "trade secrets
and commercial and financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confi-
dential." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976). See, e.g., Planning Research Corp. v. FPC, 555 F.2d
970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (request made for release of detailed computer information that
could provide competitors with a direct source of material for their own development of
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of an express statutory basis, submitters of information have attempted to
enjoin agency disclosure of proprietary documents in actions commonly
referred to as "reverse FOIA" suits.5
Although courts have permitted reverse FOIA actions,6 there has been
no consensus regarding the legal theories underlying these suits.7 The
Supreme Court recently resolved a conflict in the circuits8 over the validity
of reverse FOIA actions in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,9 finding the FOIA to
be purely a dislosure statute providing no private right of action to enjoin
similar computer systems upheld); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 443 F. Supp. 1024, 1026
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (release of submitter's test data compiled over 20 years would facilitate
other firms' access to the market and would substantially reduce competitors' research costs
at submitter's expense); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150, 160 (D.D.C.
1976) (release of submitter's work force analysis would provide an efficient and comprehen-
sive method for "raiding" highly trained employees in the competitive insurance industry);
Burroughs Corp. v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Va. 1975) (unsuccessful bidder on
government contract sought to enjoin release of information about automatic data process-
ing equipment to a competitor).
5. Reverse FOIA cases are of relatively recent origin; the first such case was decided in
1973. See Campbell, Reverse Freedom of Information Act Litigation. The Need/or Congres-
sionalAction, 67 GEO. L.J. 103, 108-10 (1978) (history of the development of reverse FOIA
suits). See generally Clement, The Rights of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Con-
fidential Business Information.: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEX. L.
REV. 587 (1977); Note, Administrative Disclosure of Private Business Records Under the Free-
dom of Information Act. An Analysis of 41ternative Methods ofReview, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV.
923 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 563 F.2d 191
(5th Cir. 1977) (gas and oil producers sought preenforcement judicial review of FPC order
requiring them to submit annual detailed information on exploration and development ex-
penditures); Union Oil Co. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976) (natural gas producer
sought to enjoin FPC from placing data concerning energy reserves on public record); Doc-
tors Hospital, Inc. v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 476 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (doctors sought to enjoin
disclosure of Medicare "provider-cost" reports); Humana, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 455 F. Supp.
1174 (E.D. Va. 1978) (hospitals sought to enjoin disclosure of Medicare "provider-cost" re-
ports); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Rumsfeld, 70 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (government
subcontractor sought to enjoin Defense Department from releasing information included in
an unsuccessful bid on a Navy contract). See also OFFICE OF INFORMATION LAW AND POL-
iCY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CASE LIST 58-62 (March 1979). For an extensive compila-
tion of reverse FOIA decisions, see Campbell, supra note 5, at 107 n.28. In reverse FOIA
actions, courts have found jurisdiction to exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Campbell,
supra note 5, at 163-64.
7. See notes 45-92 and accompanying text infra.
8. Compare Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977) (FOIA itself conferred an implied right to invoke equity
jurisdiction to enjoin disclosure) with Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir. 1978), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979) (no private cause of action can be implied under
either the FOIA or under the Trade Secrets Act). Cf. Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F.2d 627
(5th Cir. 1976) (information within FOIA exemption is not necessarily prohibited from
agency disclosure).
9. 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
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agency disclosure."° Rather, the Court concluded that Chrysler, as a sub-
mitter of information to the government, was entitled to judicial review of
the agency disclosure decision under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 11
Chrysler, as a party to lucrative government contracts, was required by
Executive Orders 11,246 and 11,375 2 to comply with federal equal em-
ployment practices. The Department of Labor's (DOL) Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) promulgated regulations requir-
ing government contractors to furnish compliance reports 3 to designated
agencies.14 The Secretary of Labor also promulgated regulations provid-
ing for public disclosure of these records notwithstanding their possible
exemption under the FOIA. 5 After Chrysler was informed by its compli-
ance agency' 6 that it had decided to release company employment data,
10. Id at 1713-14.
11. Id at 1725.
12. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), prohibits discrim-
ination in employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. These proscriptions
comprise a mandatory clause in any contract between the federal government and members
of the private sector. Id The Secretary of Labor is charged with the administration of the
Order, and the various contracting agencies are charged with enforcement of its provisions.
Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. § 684 (1966-1970 Compilation), extended these require-
ments to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. Recently, Exec. Order No. 12,086, 43
Fed. Reg. 46.501 (1978) (amending Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964)), trans-
ferred the primary responsibility for enforcement functions relating to equal employment
opportunity to the Department of Labor from the various contracting agencies.
13. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.7 to .20 (1978). The contractor's reports are subject to review
by the EEOC. The purpose of compliance reviews are to ensure that the hiring and employ-
ment practices of government contractors and subcontractors conform to government stan-
dards of nondiscrimination and affirmative action. Federal government compliance
agencies thus require contractors to submit Affirmative Action Plans (AAP's) and Equal
Employment Opportunity Forms (EEO-I's). See Connolly & Fox, Employer Rights andAc-
cess to Documents Under the Freedom of Information Act, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 203 (1977).
14. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (formerly the Defense Supply Agency) of the
Department of Defense was Chrysler's compliance agency. However, Chrysler's compliance
agency is now the Department of Labor. See note 12 supra.
15. 41 C.F.R. § 60-40.2 (1978). This regulation seeks to implement Department of La-
bor disclosure policy by making available to "any person... identifiable records obtained
or generated pursuant to Executive Order 11,246 . . . notwithstanding the applicability of
the exemption from mandatory disclosure set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552 subsection (b) . . . [so
long as such disclosure] furthers the public interest and does not impede any of the functions
of the OFCC or the Compliance Agencies. ... 41 C.F.R. § 60-40.2 (1978).
The regulations provide for agency discretion in releasing some information. See id § 60-
40.3 exempting from mandatory disclosure confidential commercial or financial information
only after receiving a satisfactory explanation from the submitter why the information
should be withheld.
16. The FOIA does not require an agency to notify a submitter that a request for infor-
mation has been made. In fact, the strict 10-day deadline within which the agency must
respond to an FOIA request can make notification difficult. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)
19791
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including tables listing job titles and personnel assignments 7 pursuant to a
third party's FOIA request, Chrysler sought to enjoin release under three
alternative arguments: that the FOIA itself barred disclosure; that "confi-
dentiality statutes" such as the Trade Secrets Act (section 1905)'8 prohib-
ited the proposed release; and that disclosure would be an abuse of agency
discretion under the APA because release conflicted with OFCCP rules.' 9
The United States District Court for Delaware held that some of the
requested information fell within the FOIA's fourth exemption regarding
confidential trade secrets and commercial information2" and that it may or
must be withheld, depending upon the applicable agency regulation. After
an examination of the DOL's pertinent confidentiality regulation21 impos-
ing criminal sanctions on government employees making any unautho-
rized disclosure of confidential business data, the district court concluded
that disclosure would not be "authorized by law" and should be enjoined
(1976). Nonetheless, some agencies have promulgated regulations providing for notification
of a submitter. See note 44 infra. For a thorough discussion of these regulations and of the
procedural problems inherent in the FOIA, see Campbell, supra note 5, at 114-30.
17. These tables, known as "manning tables," provide a detailed profile of an em-
ployer's work force according to job classification, specifying the number, sex, and race of
employees performing each job. See Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171, 175-76
(D. Del. 1976), vacated, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacatedsub nom. Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979). Although Chrysler objected to the release of other informa-
tion besides the manning tables, it failed to prove that any other category of information fell
within the FOIA's fourth exemption and, thus, was exempt from mandatory disclosure. Id
at 1712.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). The Trade Secrets Act provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department
or agency thereof, publishes. . . or makes known in any manner or to any extent
not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of his employ-
ment . . . which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes,
operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical
data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any per-
son, firm, partnership, corporation, or association. . . shall be fined not more than
$1000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both . ...
Id See notes 65-79 and accompanying text infra.
Chrysler also argued that disclosure was inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1976)
and 44 U.S.C. § 3508 (1976). See 99 S. Ct. at 1711.
19. Seeid
20. 412 F. Supp. 171, 175 (D. Del. 1979). Exemption four provides that:
(b) [FOIA] does not apply to matters that are -
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential . . ..
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976). The district court concluded that the manning tables contained
information of a commercially confidential, statistical nature. 412 F. Supp. at 177. See note
80 infra.
21. The DOL regulation prohibits any officer or employee from violating the Trade
Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). See 29 C.F.R. § 70.21(a) (1978).
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as violative of the DOL regulation. 22 Moreover, the district court found
no conflict between the OFCCP disclosure and the DOL's confidentiality
regulations.23 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed that ex-
emption from the FOIA did not in itself compel withholding of informa-
tion; however, the court concluded that since the OFCCP disclosure
regulations provided the requisite "authorization by law,",24 the DOL's
confidentiality regulation was inapplicable.25
A unanimous Supreme Court held that Congress did not design the
FOIA exemptions to be mandatory bars to disclosure limiting agency dis-
cretion. 26 The Court rejected the theory of a reverse FOIA suit, finding
that neither the Act nor its legislative history provided grounds to infer the
existence of a private right to enjoin agency action.27 The Court likewise
rejected the argument that section 1905 provided a private cause of action
to enjoin agency disclosure but alternatively decided that a submitter of
information could seek judicial review of an agency's disclosure decision
under the APA.28 Furthermore, the Court refused to accept the govern-
ment's contention that the OFCCP's regulations provided authorization by
law29 as required by section 1905 and remanded the case to the court of
appeals to determine whether the contemplated disclosure would violate
the prohibitions of section 1905.30 Justice Marshall, in a concurring opin-
ion, emphasized that he understood the holding to be limited to the finding
that OFCCP regulations did not authorize disclosure within the meaning
of section 1905."1
22. 412 F. Supp. at 179.
23. Compare 41 C.F.R. § 60-40.2 (1978) with 29 C.F.R. § 70.21(a) (1978). See notes 15
supra & 31 infra.
24. The court of appeals concluded that 5 U.S.C. § 301, a so-called "housekeeping stat-
ute," is a separate source of agency authority for promulgation of disclosure regulations and
that disclosures pursuant to its regulations are "authorized by law" within the meaning of
§ 1905. See 565 F.2d at 1187-88.
25. Id at 1191.
26. 99 S. Ct. at 1713-14.
27. Id. at 1712-14.
28. Id at 1725. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (1976).
29. The Court observed that substantive regulations, that is, those having the force and
effect of law, could not be promulgated pursuant to a "housekeeping statute," authorizing
only the promulgation of "rules of agency organization, procedure or practice" as opposed
to substantive rules. See 99 S. Ct. at 1722.
30. Id at 1726. Additionally, the Court did not resolve the question of whether de novo
review is appropriate when the APA is used to review the validity of a disclosure decision
claimed to be prohibited by § 1905. The Court thought it "unnecessary, and therefore un-
wise" to settle this question since the substantive issue remanded to the court of appeals -
the scope of § 1905 - would necessarily affect this determination. Id. See also note 84
infra.
31. 99 S. Ct. at 1726-27 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall stressed that the
19791
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A review of the FOIA's policy objectives and of the various reverse
FOIA theories prior to the Chrysler decision demonstrates that the deci-
sion provided necessary clarification to a rapidly developing body of case
law. The Court's refusal to find an implied right of action under either the
FOIA or section 1905 was consistent with the purpose and legislative his-
tory of those statutes. Moreover, the Court's recognition of a submitter's
right to a confidentiality review of an agency's disclosure decision under
the APA can provide meaningful protection for sensitive business informa-
tion.
I. FOIA: BALANCING THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN OPEN GOVERNMENT
WITH A BUSINESS CONCERN FOR PRIVACY
Congress enacted the FOIA to replace the ineffective "Public Informa-
tion" section of the APA.32 These APA disclosure provisions were vaguely
drawn, leaving agencies virtually unlimited discretion to maintain secrecy
if they perceived it to be "in the public interest," for "good cause," or if the
requested records related "solely to the internal management of an
agency."33 Moreover, the APA provided disclosure only to "persons prop-
erly and directly concerned," 34 placing the burden of proving such a con-
cern on the requesters. Consequently, these disclosure provisions
encouraged improper denials of requested information and provided no
adequate remedy to the public to force agency disclosure.35
The FOIA was enacted to replace these blanket agency denials of-public
access to information with a statutory framework that would support the
release of information. The Act wAs designed to end unnecessary govern-
ment secrecy and to afford the electorate access to the information neces-
sary for intelligent execution of the duties incumbent upon a democratic
Court's narrow holding did not determine whether federal agencies, absent a congressional
directive, may reveal information obtained during the exercise of their functions. He also
understood the opinion to leave unquestioned the general validity of the OFCCP regulations
or any other regulations promulgated under Executive Order 11,246. Furthermore, Justice
Marshall emphasized that the Court did not consider whether an executive order must be
founded on a legislative enactment. Id
32. Pub. L. No. 404, § 3, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (formerly codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1002). See
H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2418, 2420-23 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT 1497].
33. See HOUSE REPORT 1497, supra note 32, at 2422.
34. Id at 2423.
35. Id at 2422. See a/so S. REP. No. 813, supra note 3, 1974 SOURCE BOOK at 40. This
Senate Report concluded that the "Public Information" section of the APA was of little or
no value to the public in gaining access to government records and that it had, in fact,
precisely the opposite effect of promoting secrecy.
[Vol. 29:159
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society.36 The Act was not designed, however, to sacrifice all privacy
rights in the process. Congress intended the FOIA to strike a balance be-
tween the public interest in access to the bases of government's decision-
making and the private interest in preserving the confidentiality of
proprietary information submitted pursuant to government require-
ments.37
To implement this goal of balancing the potentially conflicting interests
of disclosure and privacy, the FOIA exempts from mandatory disclosure
nine specific classifications of information.3" If the information is not
within an exemption, the agency has no discretion and must release it
upon request.39 If, however, the requested information does fall within
one of the FOIA exemptions, the agency has discretion and is permitted to
withhold the information.' Thus, while a requester of information has a
cause of action under the FOIA to compel agency release of nonexempt
material,4' there is no explicit statutory provision regarding a submitter's
right to enjoin the release of exempt information.
In addition to providing for mandatory disclosure of nonexempt infor-
mation, the FOIA replaces the restrictive APA requirement that a re-
quester be "properly and directly concerned" with the provision that "any
person" be granted access to identifiable agency records. 42 The FOIA fur-
ther increases the availability of information by placing the burden of jus-
36. See HOUSE REPORT 1497, supra note 32, at 2429.
37. See S. REP. No. 813, supra note 3, 1974 SOURCE BOOK at 38:
At the same time that a broad philosophy of "freedom of information" is enacted
into law, it is necessary to protect certain equally important rights of privacy with
respect to certain information in Government files ....
It is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but it is not an impossible
one either. It is not necessary to conclude that to protect one of the interests, the
other must, of necessity, either be abrogated or substantially subordinated. Success
lies in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all
interests yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure.
See also HOUSE REPORT 1497, supra note 32, at 2423.
38. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l)-(9) (1976). The Act provides that each agency "shall make
available" to the public a wide range of enumerated classes of information. Id § 552(a). It
also states that the disclosure mandate does not apply to the release of information falling
within the nine exemptions. Id § 552(b).
39. Id § 552(a)(3)(c). Courts generally agree that agencies have no equitable discretion
to refuse to disclose nonexempt material. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425
U.S. 352, 373-74 (1976); Connolly & Fox, supra note 13, at 216; Note, Developmens Under
the Freedom of Information Act - 1976, 1977 DUKE L.J. 532, 560 n.199.
40. Commentators also generally agree that the Act's exemptions are permissive rather
than mandatory. See Clement, supra note 5, at 597-602; Connolly & Fox, supra note 13, at
223-30.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
42. Id § 552(a)(3).
1979]
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tifying a decision to withhold information on the agency rather than
requiring the requesters to show cause for the records' release, as the APA
did.4 3 Although these changes provide greater access to information, the
FOIA contains no countervailing procedural requirement that an agency
inform a submitter that an FOIA request has been made for information it
has supplied."
Nevertheless, despite the absence of uniform procedural safeguards and
an explicit FOIA cause of action, submitters of information have at-
tempted to enjoin agency disclosure of exempt material under a variety of
theories. Where the requested information contains sensitive business data
arguably within the Act's fourth exemption, these theories have been read-
ily employed in federal courts.
II. AN UNCERTAIN STATUTORY BASIS FOR CHALLENGING THE
RELEASE OF BUSINESS RECORDS UNDER THE FOIA
Although both exemption four 5 of the FOIA and the Act's legislative
history4 6 demonstrate congressional intent to protect trade secrets and
commercial or financial information from unnecessary and irresponsible
disclosure, the Act contains no express private cause of action to prevent
disclosure of exempt material. Consequently, parties interested in preserv-
ing the confidentiality of government-held information47 have used a vari-
43. Id § 552(a)(4)(B). By placing the burden of proving exempt status on the agency,
Congress created a procedural presumption in favor of disclosure. See Note, supra note 5,
at 929.
44. This omission illustrates the FOIA's focus on disclosure. The FOIA does not pro-
vide a submitter with a right of notice or a hearing concerning the proposed disclosure.
Each agency has the discretion to decide whether to provide notice. Some agencies have
issued regulations providing for notification of the submitter. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-40.4(d)
(1978) (OFCCP will allow a contractor to identify sensitive material and will inform it of a
forthcoming disclosure, giving the contractor a chance to appeal); 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.44 to .46
(1979) (FDA provides submitter with a presubmission review for claiming confidentiality of
records and provides for judicial review of proposed disclosure). Other agencies permit in-
dividuals submitting information to include a written statement explaining why the informa-
tion should not be disclosed. See also 10 C.F.R. § 2.790(b)(I)(ii) (1979) (Nuclear Regulatory
Commission); 16 C.F.R. § 1015.18 (1979) (Consumer Product Safety Commission); 17
C.F.R. § 240.24b-2 (1978) (Securities & Exchange Commission); 40 C.F.R. § 2.204(e) (1978)
(Environmental Protection Agency).
45. See note 20 supra.
46. See note 37 supra.
47. It is often a federal contractor that seeks to prevent agency disclosure of information
which the contractor was required to submit. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct.
1705 (1979). Since there is no requirement that a requester identify itself or the nature of its
interests, the requester's identity is sometimes unknown to both the agency and the submit-
ter. See text accompanying note 42 supra. A requester may be a union or an employer
seeking to discover the content of a witness's statement taken by the National Labor Rela-
[Vol. 29:159
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ety of approaches to enjoin allegedly unlawful administrative disclosures
in reverse FOIA suits. Regardless of the theory under which submitters
attempt to block disclosure, they must first establish that the information
falls within one of the nine FOIA exemptions.4 8 Once this is established,
submitters generally have advanced three theories to prevent the release of
exempt information: that the FOIA's exemptions are mandatory, thus ren-
dering disclosure of material falling within them a violation of the FOIA;
that agency release of exempt material violates a nondisclosure statute
such as section 1905; or that even if the applicability of an exemption
merely permits nondisclosure rather than mandates it, an agency's decision
to release exempt material is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law and thus reviewable under the
APA.4 9 These three theories have met with mixed success in federal
courts.
A. Implied Right Arising from the FOA Itself
The sharpest conflict in reverse FOIA suits has occurred in a dispute
over the validity of a submitter's attempt to protect its information by im-
plying a cause of action for injunctive relief under the FOIA itself. Under
this theory, a submitter asserts that the applicability of an FOIA exemp-
tion does not permit but rather requires the agency to withhold the infor-
mation because the exemptions are mandatory and, hence, disclosure
would violate the statute.,50
The implied right theory was first accepted by the United States Court
tions Board in an unfair labor practice proceeding. See Connolly & Fox, supra note 13, at
204. Frequently, public interest groups make an FOIA request to monitor employers' af-
firmative action practices. See, e.g., Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues
v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (civil rights group); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1976) (National Organization for Women). When the
identity of the requester is unknown, there exists a strong possibility that the request may
have been made by a business competitor of the submitter. See generally Patten & Wein-
stein, Disclosure of Business Secrets Under the Freedom of Information Act." Suggested Limita-
tion, 29 AD. L. REV. 193 (1977).
48. See notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra. Courts have generally agreed that
the exemptions provide the starting point for reverse FOIA actions. See Campbell, supra
note 5, at 130 n. 156; Note, Protection From Government Disclosure-the Reverse-FOIA Suit,
1976 DUKE L.J. 330, 333-34. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211,
1215 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD,
519 F.2d 935, 940-41 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Sonderegger v. United States Dep't of Interior,
424 F. Supp. 847, 851 (D. Idaho 1976).
49. See Clement, supra note 5, at 591. Other statutes have been raised in some in-
stances to support reverse FOIA actions. Id at 591 n.10 & 598 n.40.
50. See Campbell, supra note 5, at 131-35; Drachsler, The Freedom of Information Act
and the 'Right" of Non-Disclosure, 28 AD. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1976).
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of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Schles-
inger.5' Westinghouse sought to enjoin agency disclosure of its affirmative
action compliance reports to an FOIA requester. 52 The court accepted
Westinghouse's contention that the FOIA itself conferred on the submitter
an implied right to invoke equity jurisdiction to protect information falling
within an FOIA exemption.53 The court reasoned that a statute granting a
private party protection from disclosure, even if phrased in the form of an
exemption, carries with it an implied right to invoke a court's equity juris-
diction to assure that protection. 54 Additionally, the court noted that Con-
gress acted to protect the confidentiality of private information by
including exemption four to avoid such competitive harm that could un-
dermine basic free enterprise principles." Thus, the Fourth Circuit held
that the FOIA exemptions constituted mandatory bars to disclosure.
Other circuits, however, have expressed conflicting views regarding the
mandatory nature of the FOIA exemptions. In General Dynamics Corp. v.
Marshall,16 the Maritime Administration informed General Dynamics
that it had decided to release its affirmative action compliance reports pur-
suant to an FOIA request. General Dynamics sought to enjoin disclosure
of portions of these reports, arguing the existence of an implied cause of
action under both the third and fourth FOIA exemptions and under sec-
tion 1905.57 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
rejected the implied cause of action theory for a submitter under the FOIA
exemptions. The court found the exemptions to be permissive rather than
mandatory and stated that the "FOIA is simply not applicable in reverse
cases."58 The court likewise found that section 1905 did not afford a sub-
mitter of information a cause of action for injunctive relief. The Eighth
Circuit concluded, however, that section 1905's prohibitions did not apply
51. 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
52. These reports were submitted by Westinghouse, a federal contractor, in compliance
with Executive Orders 11,246 and 11,375. See note 12 and accompanying text supra. In
Westinghouse, the FOIA requesters were the Legal Aid Society of Alameda County and the
Hill House Association, who intervened as party defendants prior to this appeal. See West-
inghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1974), aft'd, 542 F.2d
1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
53. 542 F.2d at 1211. The court acknowledged the relationships between the FOIA
exemptions and the applicability of a statute prohibiting disclosure of specified information
such as § 1905.
54. Id.
55. The court's use of the FOIA's legislative history in the case has been criticized as
untenable. See Drachsler, supra note 50, at 6-7.
56. 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979). See note 61 infra.
57. Id at 1213-17. The Maritime Administration was General Dynamics' compliance
agency. See note 12 supra.
58. Id at 1215-16.
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because the OFCCP regulations provided the necessary authorization by
law for disclosure as required by section 1905.'9 Moreover, the court con-
cluded that General Dynamics had a right to seek judicial review of the
agency disclosure decision under the APA.6 °
Under factual circumstances virtually identical to those in General Dy-
namics, the Seventh Circuit in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd6, rejected
Sears' argument that both the third FOIA exemption and section 1905 pro-
hibited release of affirmative action data and provided a basis for an im-
plied cause of action. The Seventh Circuit held that neither of those
statutory provisions provided any such basis.62 Rather, the court adopted
the General Dynamics reasoning that the OFCCP disclosure regulations
satisfied the "authorized by law" exception of section 1905 .63 Finally, the
Seventh Circuit likewise concluded that Sears was entitled to judicial re-
view of the agency disclosure decision under the APA.6
B. Injunctive Relief Arising Under a Nondisclosure Statute Such as
Section 1905
Rarely did a reverse plaintiff proceed under a single cause of action the-
ory in a reverse FOIA suit. As shown above, the claim of an implied right
under an FOIA exemption was usually accompanied by an alternative ar-
gument that another statute, usually the Trade Secrets Act (section 1905),
protected the claimed confidentiality of a submitter's information.
The current version of section 1905 was enacted in 1948 and was in-
tended merely to consolidate three prior nondisclosure statutes.65 Section
59. Id at 1217. Section 1905 prohibits disclosure of specific material unless that disclo-
sure is "authorized by law." See note 18 supra. The OFCCP regulations cited as authoriz-
ing disclosure are 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-40.1 to .2 (1978). See General Dynamics Corp. v.
Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1215-16 (8th Cir. 1978).
60. Id at 1217.
61. 575 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979). This case, along with
General Dynamics, was vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of the
Chrysler decision.
62. Id at 1202.
63. Although both courts concluded that the OFCCP regulations provided the requisite
authorization, they did not agree on the identity of the source giving these regulations the
force and effect of law. The General Dynamics court implied that the regulations were valid
because they were promulgated pursuant to Executive Orders 11,246 and 11,375. See 572
F.2d at 1215. The Sears court, however, found the disclosure regulations to be clearly au-
thorized under 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976), a "housekeeping statute." See 575 F.2d at 1200.
64. Id at 1200-01. Accord, Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976); Charles
River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
65. See Clement, supra note 5, at 607-13. These statutes were: a Commerce Depart-
ment nondisclosure statute, Act of Jan. 27, 1938, ch. 11, 52 Stat. 8 (1938) (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976)) (statute applied only to employees of the Bureau of Foreign &
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1905 imposes criminal sanctions on any government employee who, unless
otherwise "authorized by law," permits the release of information that
"concerns or relates to the trade secrets,. . . confidential statistical data,
amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any
person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association."66
Reverse FOIA plaintiffs generally sought to use these prohibitions
against disclosure under three theories: that section 1905's applicability im-
plied in itself a private cause of action; that information included within
the scope of section 1905 was exempt from mandatory disclosure because
section 1905 was a nondisclosure statute within the scope of the FOIA's
third exemption;67 and that information within section 1905 may not be
disclosed because it fell under the FOIA's fourth exemption.
Because section 1905 is a criminal statute, courts have adhered to estab-
lished principles of statutory interpretation and have been unwilling to im-
ply a private cause of action.68 The principles enunciated in the Supreme
Court's decision in Cort v. Ash69 serve as a guide to determine whether a
private remedy can be implied in a statute otherwise lacking such a provi-
sion. One of these four principles requires an indication of legislative in-
Domestic Commerce and prohibited their release of statistical information furnished in con-
fidence to the Bureau); an income tax nondisclosure statute, Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, §
38, 13 Stat. 223 (1864) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976)) (statute prohibited United
States employees from disclosing "in any manner, whatever not provided by law" opera-
tions, style of work, or apparatus of any taxpayer visited by the federal employee pursuant to
his official duties); and a Tariff Commission nondisclosure statute, Revenue Act of 1916, ch.
463, § 708, 39 Stat. 756 (1916) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976)) (statute prohibited
a federal officer's disclosure of any "trade secret or process" which was "embraced in" any
examination or investigation undertaken by the Tariff Commission and whose disclosure
was not "provided for by law").
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
67. Exemption three originally covered material specifically exempt from disclosure
under other statutes. However, in 1976 Congress amended the exemption which now pro-
vides:
This section does not apply to matters that are -
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of
this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from
the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes
particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be
withheld.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
68. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1202 (7th Cir. 1978); General
Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (8th Cir. 1978). See also notes 56-64
and accompanying text supra.
69. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Court found that four factors are relevant in determining
whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute:
(1) Whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted;
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tent to imply a private cause of action. Since this requirement has not
been found in the legislative history of section 1905, no private right of
action has been implied.7°
The second argument raised under section 1905 maintains that this stat-
ute was one of those included within the scope of the FOIA's third exemp-
tion.7" This provision, formerly exempting from mandatory disclosure
matters that were "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute," was
used to enjoin the release of commercial and trade secret information. A
submitter's objection to agency release of its business data based on a
claim that such matters were exempt from the FOIA's provisions under the
third exemption was strengthened by the Supreme Court decision in FAA
v. Robertson.72 The Court interpreted this exemption very broadly, read-
ing it to encompass all preexisting nondisclosure statutes.73 In 1976, how-
ever, Congress amended exemption three with the express intent of
overruling the Robertson decision.7 ' The scope of the amended exemption
was narrowed considerably by removing those preexisting nondisclosure
statutes whose provisions for secrecy were so broad as to be incompatible
with the FOIA's disclosure policy.75 Thus, more recent reverse FOIA liti-
gation has arisen over the relationship between exemption four and section
1905.
In raising this final section 1905 argument to prevent disclosure, submit-
ters claim that the information falls within the fourth FOIA exemption
providing that the FOIA disclosure mandate does not apply to trade
secrets and commercial or financial information that is privileged or confi-
dential. In order to raise section 1905 to limit an agency's disclosure of a
reverse plaintiffs documents successfully, a court made a dual determina-
(2) Whether there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, ei-
ther to create such a remedy or to deny one;
(3) Whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy;
(4) Whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law.
Id at 78.
70. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1202 (7th Cir. 1978).
71. See note 67 supra.
72. 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
73. Id at 265-66. See also Campbell, note 5 supra, at 146. The Robertson decision was
relied upon by two courts for the proposition that § 1905 was an exemption-three statute.
See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1202 (4th Cir. 1976); Babcock
& Wilcox Co. v. Rumsfeld, 70 F.R.D. 595, 601 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
74. See H.R. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1976) (Conference Report), re-
printedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2244, 2261.
75. See note 69 supra. See generally Note, The Effect of the 1976Amendment to Exemp-
tion Three of the Freedom of Information Act, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1976). See also
Campbell, supra note 5, at 149-50.
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tion. First, it determined whether the information fell within the substan-
tive scope of the fourth exemption and/or section 1905.76 If the court
determined that the information fell within both provisions, it then de-
cided whether disclosure would nevertheless be "authorized by law" under
section 1905 and was thus permissible. It has not been clear, however,
whether the FOIA itself can be regarded as the authorization by law re-
quired for disclosure by section 1905.77 If the FOIA "does not apply" to
exempt material, it cannot authorize disclosure of section 1905 material.78
Thus, submitters would argue that the FOIA does not apply to material
specifically exempt under its own provisions, so that agency disclosure of
FOIA exempt material falling within section 1905 is prohibited unless
otherwise properly authorized by another source.79
C. Judicial Review of an FOJA Disclosure Decision Under the APA
Some courts have attempted to balance the interest of public access to
information with the need for business confidentiality under the provisions
of the APA.8° Thus, where submitters have been unable to sustain an ac-
tion directly under the FOIA or section 1905, courts have considered these
statutes under the umbrella of the APA. Accordingly, if a submitter re-
ceives knowledge of a pending agency release and delays immediate dis-
closure by either stipulation of the parties, temporary restraining order, or
preliminary injunction, it can seek a remedy by alleging that the agency
disclosure decision is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law."'" In this situation, the submitter,
as a person "aggrieved by agency action," is entitled to judicial review
76. See Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
77. See Campbell, supra note 5, at 150-51.
78. See id. at 145. On the other hand, if a court determined that the information is not
exempt under the FOIA, the FOIA requires its release, thereby supplying the authorization
by law necessary for the release of information also covered by § 1905. Id
79. Neither reverse FOIA plaintiffs nor courts hearing their arguments have been able
to settle with any consistency the legal effect of the relationship between § 1905 and exemp-
tion four. See id See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir.
1978); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Burroughs
Corp. v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Va. 1975).
80. A test interpreting the scope of exemption four to determine whether financial infor-
mation is confidential was formulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770
(D.C. Cir. 1974). This test, which has been applied by other courts, provides that matter is
confidential if it is likely (1) to impair the government's ability to obtain information in the
future or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom
the information was obtained. Id
81. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
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thereof.82 Under the APA, the reviewing court is authorized to "hold un-
lawful and set aside such agency action."83 Since the APA normally pro-
vides for review of the existing administrative record rather than for a de
novo review," submitters must rely on the protection afforded them by the
established record rather than having the latitude to defend their informa-
tion's confidentiality de novo. Despite this perceived shortcoming, submit-
ters seeking protection of such materials have sought APA review by the
courts.8 5
In Charles River Park "'" Inc. v. HUD, 6 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia employed the APA "abuse of discre-
tion" standard to review an agency decision to disclose information. The
operators of multi-family housing projects whose mortgages were insured
by the Federal Housing Administration sought to enjoin the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from disclosing financial re-
ports revealing the project's gross income to Boston's Commissioner of As-
sessing. The court recognized the necessity of determining whether the
FOIA's fourth exemption applied to the information since the government
would be obligated to disclose the information if no exemption applied.87
Alternatively, however, if the exemption applied and if the information
also fell within section 1905 prohibiting disclosure under threat of criminal
sanctions, it would be an abuse of discretion under the APA for HUD to
release the information. 8 Considering the FOIA and section 1905 under
the APA, the court determined that the interests to be balanced were the
82. Id § 702.
83. Id. § 706(2).
84. See Campbell, supra note 5, at 135-43. One problem surrounding reverse FOIA
actions based on the APA is that of determining the appropriate standard of review. It is
unclear whether or not the de novo review provided for by the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(B) (1976), should be applied to reverse FOIA actions under the APA.
85. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1217-18 (8th Cir.
1978); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 940 n.4, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Parkridge Hosp. Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 430 F. Supp. 1093, 1095-96 (E.D. Tenn.
1977); GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 404 F. Supp. 352, 366-67 (D.
Del. 1975), a~fd on rehearing, 443 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Del. 1977).
Although the focal point for judicial review under the APA should be the administrative
record already in existence, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976), there are occasions when the reviewing
court is justified in going beyond the limited administrative record. See Camp v. Pitts, 411
U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420
(1971). However, an extensive inquiry, as a general rule, should be avoided in order to
maintain the integrity of the administrative process. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S.
409, 422 (1941); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 491 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974).
86. 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
87. Id at 940-41.
88. Id at 941-42.
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public interest in accurate tax assessments and the housing project owners'
interest in keeping their income confidential. On remand, the District of
Columbia Circuit directed the district court to consider these factors while
determining whether the information fell within the fourth exemption
and/or section 1905.89
Similarly, in General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall,9" the Eighth Circuit
conducted an APA review to determine from the administrative record
whether the agency decision to disclose was an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance with law.9' The district court had considered
the agency's factual judgment in light of the possible applicability of an
FOIA exemption and the legal standards employed by the agency in its
decision to exercise its discretion to disclose. The Eighth Circuit held that
the court erred in construing the FOIA exemptions as mandatory and re-
manded for review of General Dynamics' confidentiality claim on the ba-
sis of the existing administrative record in accordance with APA
standards. 92
III. CHRYSLER CORP. v. BROWN: ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SUBMITTER'S
RIGHT TO A CONFIDENTIALITY REVIEW
Although the recent Supreme Court decision in Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown9 3 left a number of questions unresolved, it eliminated the prior un-
certainty surrounding the statutory basis of reverse FOIA suits. Signifi-
cantly, the Court was unanimous in its holding that Congress did not
intend the FOIA exemptions to be mandatory bars to agency disclosure.94
The Court supported its holding with legislative history indicating that the
exemptions were designed only to permit an agency to withhold certain
information and were not intended to mandate nondisclosure. 95 Further-
89. Id at 943. The court added that if the public interest consideration supported dis-
closure, the fact that it was submitted in confidence would not be enough to establish the
disclosure as an abuse of discretion. Id.
90. 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
91. Id at 1217. The court stated that General Dynamics was not entitled to a de novo
review under the APA. Id
92. Id at 1216-17.
93. 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
94. Id at 1713.
95. Id at 1713-14. The Court cited legislative history that states:
[The FOIA] sets up workable standards for the categories of records which may be
exempted from disclosure . ...
There may be legitimate reasons for nondisclosure and [the FOIA] is designed to
permit nondisclosure in such cases. ..
[The FOIA] lists in a later subsection the specific categories of information
which may be exempted from disclosure.
Id at 1714 (emphasis added by Court).
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more, the Court determined that the FOIA is a disclosure statute exclu-
sively since it explicitly gives federal courts jurisdiction to enjoin an
agency's withholding of records9 6 but does not provide a companion provi-
sion to bar disclosure. Thus, a submitter of information has an enforcea-
ble interest to preserve confidentiality under the FOIA "only to the extent
that this interest is endorsed by the agency collecting the information.
97
By deciding that the FOIA does not afford a plaintiff any private right to
enjoin disclosure, the Court extinguished the theory that reverse FOIA
suits were implied under the FOIA exemptions.
The Chrysler decision further clarified two questions inherent in section
1905 reverse FOIA suits: whether a private right to injunctive relief can be
implied under section 1905; and whether disclosure is barred by section
1905 or permitted because it is otherwise authorized by law. In the first
instance, the Court rejected Chrysler's contention that section 1905 affords
such a private right;98 in the second, the Court found that the disclosure
regulations relied on by the compliance agency did not provide the requi-
site authorization by law to satisfy section 1905.99 In rejecting the theory
that section 1905 provides a private right of action, the Court invoked its
Cori v. Ash " analysis, noting that a private right of action is rarely im-
plied under a criminal statute. In those circumstances where it has been
implied, the Court noted that there has been at least a statutory basis for
making such an inference.'°' The Court, however, was unable to find such
a basis within section 1905.
In addressing the second issue of whether disclosure was barred or
whether it was "authorized by law" under section 1905, the Court dis-
agreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that section 1905 was inappli-
cable to the agency disclosure because such release was "authorized by
law" under the OFCCP disclosure regulations.'0 2 Failing to find the req-
uisite authorization in these regulations, the Court stated that an agency
regulation must be of the "substantive" or "legislative" type to have "the
force and effect of law."' 0 3 The OFCCP disclosure regulations, promul-
96. 99 S. Ct. at 1713. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
97. 99 S. Ct. at 1713.
98. Id at 1725.
99. Id at 1714-15.
100. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
101. 99 S. Ct. at 1725.
102. Id at 1714. The regulations relied on by the agency to authorize disclosure were 41
C.F.R. §§ 60.40.1 to .4 (1978). See note 15 supra.
103. 99 S. Ct. at 1717-18. Agency regulations are either of the general, interpretative
type or of the substanti'e, legislative type. Interpretative rules deal with general statements
of policy or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice, and their promulgation
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gated pursuant to Executive Order 11,246, failed in this regard because
they lacked any identifiable "nexus" between the authority they purported
to grant and the delegation of legislative authority upon which they were
promulgated."° Moreover, these regulations failed to meet the procedural
requirements of a regulation having the force and effect of law,' 0 5 thus
strengthening the Court's conclusion that no legal authority existed to cir-
cumvent the disclosure prohibitions of section 1905.
Submitters of private business information, however, were not left with-
out a means to challenge an agency decision to release arguably confiden-
tial information under Chrysler. The Court recognized that while neither
the FOIA exemptions nor section 1905 provides an independent cause of
action, review is available under the APA.' °6 Thus, violations found
under these statutes would be dispositive on the outcome of a judicial re-
view of agency action."0 7 Under an APA review, section 1905 must be
considered because that statute places a substantive limit on agency action
prohibiting any disclosure that is not otherwise "in accordance with law"
within the meaning of APA.10
8
The Chrysler Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to deter-
mine whether the contemplated disclosures would violate the prohibition
of section 1905.1"9 In so doing, the Supreme Court expressly declined to
determine the relative ambits of the fourth exemption and section 1905 or
need not be preceded by notice or a hearing. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1976). Substan-
tive rules, on the other hand, affect "individual rights and obligations" and must be promul-
gated in accordance with certain specified procedures. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,
232 (1974). In addition to meeting these requirements, a substantative regulation, in order to
have the force and effect of law, must be rooted in a grant of quasi-legislative power by the
Congress and be subject to the limitations imposed by Congress. See 99 S. Ct. at 1718.
104. The Court's "nexus" test for discerning proper legislative authority imposes a de-
manding standard on agencies seeking to use regulations to satisfy § 1905's "authorized by
law" exception. The Court found that the origins of the congressional authority for Execu-
tive Order 11,246 were "somewhat obscure," and, thus, insufficient to give the OFCCP regu-
lations "the force and effect of law" as required for authorized disclosure under § 1905. Id
at 1719. The Court also rejected the government's argument that 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976), a
housekeeping statute, could provide authority for limiting the scope of § 1905. 99 S. Ct. at
1721-22.
105. In order for a regulation to have the force and effect of law, it must be promulgated
in strict compliance with the APA 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). See United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 758 (1972). In the case of the OFCCP regulations, they
were treated essentially as interpretative rules, and interested parties were not afforded the
notice of proposed rulemaking required for substantive rules under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976).
99 S. Ct. at 1724.
106. 99 S. Ct. at 1725.
107. Id
108. Id at 1726. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
109. 99 S. Ct. at 1726.
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to decide whether section 1905 is an exempting statute within the terms of
the FOIA's third exemption."o Since the decision regarding the sub-
stantative scope of section 1905 would necessarily have some effect on the
proper scope of judicial review under the APA, the Court likewise declined
to address that issue."'1
The Chrysler decision provided welcome clarification of the theories un-
derlying reverse FOIA actions. The Court's elimination of reverse FOIA
lawsuits based on an implied cause of action under either an FOIA exemp-
tion or section 1905 was an adoption of the majority view among the cir-
cuits.' 12 Moreover, the Court's conclusion is consistent with the FOIA's
legislative history and its purpose as a disclosure statute.' 13 If Congress
had intended to provide submitters with a cause of action through the ex-
emptions, its emphasis on their permissive nature would be incongru-
ous. 114 Furthermore, Congress expressly set out the rights of requesters in
the Act." 5 Its failure to set out corresponding protective rights for submit-
ters suggests strongly that none were intended, and there exists no reason-
able basis for implying such a right.
Similarly, the Court adhered to sound principles of statutory construc-
tion in refusing to imply a private cause of action under the criminal stat-
ute, section 1905. The criteria for making such an implication under any
federal statute, as delineated in Cort v. Ash," 6 were not present in section
1905. Significantly, however, the Court accorded section 1905 an impor-
tant role in defending the confidential status of business's proprietary in-
formation. Thus, this statute is now of critical importance in any defense
of business data's confidentiality under the approach prescribed by the
Supreme Court in Chrysler.
The Court's ultimate resort to an APA confidentiality review for deter-
mining the legitimacy of an agency's disclosure decision was a predictable
adoption of the procedure employed by the majority of courts in reverse
FOIA cases." 7 Since these courts examined an agency's disclosure deci-
110. Id at 1726 n.49. See notes 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
I 1. Id at 1726. See note 84 supra.
112. See notes 56-64, 68-70 and accompanying text supra. In so doing, the Court re-
jected the conclusion of the Fourth Circuit in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542
F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), that Congress' inclusion of the fourth exemption protecting the
confidentiality of business information must necessarily suggest a congressional intent to
provide a submitter with a private cause of action to preserve its interests.
113. See note 3 supra.
114. See note 95 supra.
115. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
116. See note 69 supra.
117. See notes 80-92 and accompanying text supra.
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sion under the APA's "arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with
law" standards, the Chrysler decision might well be regarded as acknowl-
edging the propriety of commonly employed reviewing procedures. While
submitters have been put on notice that their implied right theories are no
longer viable,' 8 they are entitled to judicial review of the decision under
the administrative safeguards of the APA." 9 Nevertheless, Chrysler ar-
guably affects the substantive "rights" of submitters since APA review of
agency disclosure decisions does not provide submitters with a direct
means to petition a court to prevent disclosure.
Moreover, the Chrysler decision does not purport to balance FOIA pol-
icy objectives in cases previously known as reverse FOIA actions. It is
significant, however, that such a need has been articulated. Justice Rehn-
quist, acknowledging that increased public access to governmental infor-
mation undoubtedly impacts upon the privacy concerns of
nongovernmental entities, stated that "as a matter of policy some balanc-
ing and accommodation may well be desirable."' 2 ° The Court, however,
stopped short of providing any solutions.
This shortcoming is indicative of the major failure of the Chrysler deci-
sion; that is, the Court's refusal to decide important questions inherent in
any litigation over the rights of submitters under the FOIA. Although the
Court did define the criteria under which agency regulations must be scru-
tinized to determine whether they provide the authorization by law needed
for discretionary disclosure of FOIA-exempt material under section
1905,2' the Court refused to determine the proper scope of section 1905.
Furthermore, the Court refused to settle the questions of whether section
1905 is an exempting statute under the FOIA's third exemption; whether
exemption four and section 1905 are coextensive; or whether the scope of
judicial review for section 1905 violations is de novo or limited to a review
of the administrative record.' 22 Since the lower courts have once again
been left to grapple with these questions, much activity and uncertainty in
this area of law can be expected.
IV. BEYOND CHRYSLER: A MORE PROMISING OUTLOOK FOR
BUSINESS CONFIDENTIALITY
Litigation after the Chrysler decision will most likely begin to clarify the
118. 99 S. Ct. at 1725.
119. Id.
120. Id at 1713.
121. See notes 103-05 and accompanying text supra.
122. 99 S. Ct. at 1726.
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degree of accommodation to be expected and the methods to be used for
balancing the public and private interests in government-held information.
Since the Court held that the FOIA exemptions were not mandatory bars
to disclosure, lower courts must balance these competing interests in deter-
mining whether information is exempt from mandatory disclosure under
the FOIA and whether it also falls within section 1905, prohibiting disclo-
sure unless "authorized by law."
As a criminal statute, the broad language of section 1905 must be nar-
rowly construed.' 23 A broad reading of this statute would be undesirable
and inconsistent with its legislative history 24 since it could prohibit disclo-
sure of virtually all business-related information. 25 Thus, if the FOIA's
fourth exemption and section 1905 are construed as coextensive,' 26 only
material falling within both provisions must be withheld when disclosure
is not otherwise authorized by law. In this situation, the fourth exemption
becomes, in effect, mandatory because information falling within it is also
within the protection of section 1905 and, thus, disclosure is prohibited. 27
If section 1905 is interpreted more narrowly than exemption four, the
agency has discretion to release information outside the ambit of section
1905 but nevertheless within exemption four.
An interesting issue for future litigation arises when section 1905 is con-
strued more broadly than exemption four. One could argue that only in-
formation common to both is protected and that disclosure is prohibited as
to such common information. 28 Under this approach, material included
in section 1905 but not included in exemption four must be disclosed
under the provisions of the FOIA itself. However, one could also argue
that information falling within the scope of section 1905 but outside the
scope of exemption four must not be released because section 1905 is an
independent bar to disclosure and, thus, disclosure is not authorized by
law. The Chrysler decision leaves this issue unresolved.
Assuming section 1905 applies, reviewing courts can find that confiden-
123. See Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
124. See note 65 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court has ruled on at least
two occasions that the substantive scope of a present statute cannot exceed the combined
scopes of its predecessor statutes without express legislative intent to expand their reach.
See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 470 (1975); United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 259-
60 (1966).
125. See note 65 supra. It is difficult to imagine what business data could not theoreti-
cally be included under this sweeping language.
126. See notes 18, 20 supra.
127. See Plesser, Chrysler Opinion: Somethingfor Everyone, Legal Times of Washington,
May 7, 1979, at 44-45.
128. See Campbell, supra note 5, at 145-51.
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tiality must be preserved only if the disclosure is not otherwise "authorized
by law." Such authorization may, for example, be provided by an agency
regulation having the "force and effect of law." A report presented re-
cently to the American Bar Association's Section of Public Contract Law
in response to the Chrysler decision observed that the Supreme Court has
"brought section 1905 out of the closet" in a significant step toward devel-
oping a meaningful method of protecting federal contractor data. 29
Following the Chrysler decision, two courts that have examined an
agency disclosure regulation in accordance with the Chrysler criteria have
found the regulation to provide the proper authorization by law to permit
disclosure. In Brookwood Medical Center, Inc. v. Ca4fano,' 30 several hos-
pitals sought to enjoin the Secretary of HEW from releasing "provider cost
reports" submitted by the hospitals pursuant to rules governing Medicare
reimbursement. The agency contended that release of the reports pursuant
to an agency regulation' 3' was a disclosure "authorized by law." The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ex-
amined the statutory authority for the regulation under the Chrysler crite-
ria"' and concluded that all the criteria had been satisfied, including the
requirement of a "nexus" between the regulation and the delegation of
legislative authority under which it was enacted.' 33 The court, therefore,
refused to enjoin release of the information that would otherwise have
been prohibited by section 1905.
In an identical factual situation, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to enjoin the release of a nursing
home's annual cost reports in Cedars Nursing & Convalescent Center, Inc. v.
Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co. 13' The court held that a financial
intermediary and agent of HEW was authorized to disclose information
pursuant to the applicable agency regulation since it fulfilled the Chrysler
criteria. 135
In addition to agency regulations, a statute might also provide the au-
129. See Freedom of Information: Chrysler Ruling Brings Trade Secrets Act Out of the
Closet, reprinted in [1979] 782 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) A-24 (May 21, 1979). The attorney
presenting this report suggested that it would be more fruitful to capitalize on what the
Supreme Court has done rather than to tinker with the statutory provisions.
130. 470 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
131. The disclosure regulation cited by HEW was 20 C.F.R. § 422.435 (1979).
132. See note 103 supra.
133. 470 F. Supp. at 1249-50.
134. 472 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
135. The regulation here, as in Brookwood, was 20 C.F.R. § 422.435 (1979). In both
cases, the courts found that the agencies' disclosure regulation was of a type contemplated
by Congress when it enacted the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976).
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thorization by law required for disclosure under section 1905. In Martin
Marietta Corp. v. FTC,3 6 another post-Chrysler decision, the plaintiff at-
tempted to enjoin the FTC's proposed release to the Arizona Attorney
General of the transcript of a deposition given by a Marietta officer, claim-
ing it fell within the FOIA's third and fourth exemptions. The court,
adopting the approach prescribed in Chrysler, considered both the plain-
tiffs FOIA argument and the possible applicability of section 1905's
prohibitions and concluded that agency release would not be an abuse of
discretion under the APA. The court held that it was unnecessary to con-
sider whether the material was prohibited from disclosure by section 1905
because agency release was otherwise authorized by law under the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
137
Not only have courts begun to reassess their positions in light of
Chrysler, but agencies also have been forced to review their practices and
procedures regarding submitters' rights under the FOIA. One positive step
has already been taken by the Justice Department that should serve to
implement the FOIA's policy objectives. In a memorandum circulated to
all agency general counsels, 138 an assistant attorney general in the Civil
Division of the Justice Department has outlined recommended agency
procedures and standards to deal with "reverse" cases. Due to the neces-
sity for reasoned agency review in light of Chrysler, the Justice Depart-
ment suggested that it is in the government's interest to seek immediate
remand to the agencies of pending reverse FOIA cases for the creation of
new administrative records. The memorandum directed that agencies,
upon remand, should contact the original data requester to insure that
there still exists an actual case or controversy and possibly require an up-
dated expression of interest, solicit from the submitter any detailed written
objections to disclosure, and insure that agency disclosure decisions in-
clude a full explanation and documentation of all reasons supporting the
agency's acceptance or rejection of the submitter's objections.' 39 By in-
cluding the submitter in the agency's decisionmaking process, these recom-
mended procedures will serve to balance the FOIA's competing interests.
Concomitantly, a thorough and well-documented administrative record
136. No. 79-0162 (D.D.C., filed July 13, 1979).
137. Id. at 12-13. The court found that the information was not a "trade secret" within
the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1976), and thus, could
be released.
138. Justice Dep't Memorandum: Current and Future Litigation Under Chrysler v.
Brown, reprinted in [1979] 435 PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) D-I (June
21, 1979).
139. Id at D-1.
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will be welcomed by reviewing courts and submitters as well.' 40
In addition to judicial and agency reaction, there has also been a re-
sponse to the Chrysler decision on Capitol Hill.'4 ' Senator Robert Dole
announced his intention to introduce legislation to "insure that the FOIA
serves the public's need to know what Government is doing, not the pri-
vate desire to know what competitors are doing." He also contended that
the FOIA "has been twisted into an instrument for industrial espio-
nage."' 142 Apparently dissatisfied with Chrysler's elimination of reverse
FQIA suits allowing submitters to imply a cause of action directly under
the FOIA or section 1905, Senator Dole stated that his legislation would
give submitters of information standing and a statutory right to object to
agency disclosure of their confidential information. Under this provision,
submitters would be able to bring the type of reverse FOIA suit that
Chrysler attempted to bring. Additionally, this proposal would expand the
FOIA's fourth exemption to prevent all disclosures of company documents
which do not reflect "Government conduct" and are not the kind "nor-
mally released by the company."'' 43 Finally, provisions similar to those
suggested by the Justice Department would be included, establishing a
submitter's right to identify documents it believes are confidential, to re-
ceive prompt notice of any FOIA request for this information, and to al-
low a submitter to comment on the requested disclosure.'"
V. CONCLUSION
The Chrysler decision recognizes the fundamental tension between the
policies of broad disclosure of government-held information under the
FOIA and the protection of privacy interests recognized in the FOIA's
fourth exemption, as well as in section 1905. In rejecting the "reverse
FOIA" theory as a private cause of action, the Court has denied the exist-
ence of an implied right of direct access to court for submitters to contest a
pending agency disclosure of proprietary records. At the same time, how-
ever, the Court has recognized a submitter's right to a confidentiality re-
view under the APA to determine whether the agency violated the
safeguards of section 1905 and, thus, acted either illegally or abusively.
It remains to be seen whether the Chrysler decision will be an effective
instrument in effectuating the balance between the FOIA and its exemp-
140. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
141. For a discussion of the need for legislation to deal with "reverse FOIA" suits, see
Campbell, note 5 supra.
142. 125 CONG. REC. S4504 (daily ed. April 23, 1979).
143. Id
144. Id at S4505.
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tions. Future litigation will most likely determine the validity of agency
disclosure regulations and define the substantive scope of section 1905.
Adjustments of agency policy and, most importantly, of agency procedures
in handling FOIA requests for government-held business information
have already begun to affect this balance. These adjustments should halt
the abuse of the FOIA among corporate and industrial competitors where
such abuse exists; however, the adjustments must also reflect a commit-
ment to open government. Effective administrative enforcement of impor-
tant national policy goals, such as commitment to equal employment
opportunity, depends largely upon public scrutiny of those enforcement.
mechanisms.
Kevin R. Barry

